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Abstract 
 
We investigate the question of how long top scientists retain their stardom. We observe 
the research performance of all Italian professors in the sciences over three consecutive 
four-year periods, between 2001 and 2012. The top scientists of the first period are 
identified on the basis of research productivity, and their performance is then tracked 
through time. The analyses demonstrate that more than a third of the nation’s top 
scientists maintain this status over the three consecutive periods, with higher shares 
occurring in the life sciences and lower ones in engineering. Compared to males, 
females are less likely to maintain top status. There are also regional differences, among 
which top status is less likely to survive in southern Italy than in the north. Finally we 
investigate the longevity of unproductive professors, and then check whether the career 
progress of the top and unproductive scientists is aligned with their respective 
performances. The results appear to have implications for national policies on academic 
recruitment and advancement. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the distinctive competences of world-class universities is their ability to 
attract and retain talented professors. They contribute to the prestige of the institutions 
where they work, attract talented students, receive research grants and funding from 
companies. The choices faced by faculty hiring committees are then both important and 
difficult. Especially for younger candidates, this includes the aspect of predicting the 
likelihood of future scientific success. Recently, decision-makers have increasingly 
turned to quantitative approaches to inform their judgments, thanks to the rapid 
development of bibliometrics. Once an appropriate research performance indicator (or 
set of indicators) is defined, achievements in research can be measured and compared. 
Scientists with outstanding achievement (typically called “top scientists”, or TSs), can 
be identified as those falling in the top x% out of the total number of their colleagues 
considering the chosen performance indicator, or as the individuals with performance 
scores above a certain threshold (for example, the second or the third mean of 
performance distribution, when analyzed with the Characteristic Scores and Scales 
(CSS) technique). 
The issues concerning TSs have been of particular interest to scholars in sociology 
and scientometrics, and they have been studied from different perspectives, among 
others: in terms of their share of contribution to the overall scientific advancement 
produced by a research system (Abramo et al., 2013a); in gender analyses (Nowell and 
Hedges, 1998; Abramo et al., 2009); for the structure of their research collaboration 
networks (Azoulay et al., 2010); for their roles in the transfer of scientific knowledge to 
industry (Zucker and Darby, 1997; Zucker et al., 2002; Link et al., 2007). 
Given the remarkable contributions in both social and research roles, a number of 
studies have investigated the possible determinants of the outstanding performance of 
TSs, over and above their personal merits, such as factors concerning collaboration rates 
(Lee and Bozeman, 2005), age (Levin and Stephan, 1991), academic origin and 
affiliation (Long et al., 2009) and incentive systems (Miller et al., 2013). In this line, the 
literature very often returns to the matter of the Matthew effect (Merton, 1968), which 
implies that advantage generates further advantage. Merton suggests that eminent 
scientists will often get more credit than a comparatively unknown researcher, even if 
their work is similar, meaning that credit would usually be given to researchers who are 
already famous. Due to this, being a TS at time t0 should increase the likelihood of still 
being a TS at time t1. Among other authors, Burrell (2003) examines the presence of 
success-breeds-success phenomenon in the case of citation accumulation. Also, Petersen 
et. al. (2011; 2014) investigate the presence of cumulative advantage in the careers of 
scientists and find that up to a certain point, reputation plays a key role in the impact of 
future publications. 
Certainly, the scientist’s personal talents must play a decisive role in their rise to 
the top, or “star” levels. The individual’s inculcated talents would not rapidly fade 
away, and assuming that the Matthew effect holds true, then TSs could maintain their 
stardom through their entire careers. However, the longevity of TS status would also 
depend on the dynamics of the individual’s external and internal (personal) 
environment. Within the former, the changes in competition within the field of research, 
the encounter of barriers to entry, paradigmatic shifts, changes in the direct 
administrative and working environment, or in availability of resources and 
collaboration networks, could all affect scientific performance. Within the latter, family 
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changes, changes of interests or moves into managerial positions could affect 
performance. 
With this work, given the range of contrasting factors potentially at play in 
determining the longevity of the TS status, we attempt to shed light on a first, simple 
question: how long, in fact, do top scientists maintain their stardom? To the best of our 
knowledge, the only previous work investigating the longevity of TSs is by Hess and 
Rothaermel (2012). Their field of observation was the private sector, in particular star 
scientists in biotech and pharmaceutical industries. The authors employed five-year 
rolling windows of publication and citation performance in the period 1974-2006. They 
identified TSs as the scientists having a publication and citation count three standard 
deviations above the mean for a specific five-year interval. The authors then calculated 
the number of rolling windows in which the scientist held their star status. The average 
number of windows for biotech stars was 2.5 (6.5 years), while for those in pharma 
sector it was 4.1 (8 years). Hess and Rothaermel (2012) conclude that “...the analysis 
empirically supports the idea that a Matthew effect in science does indeed exist in the 
biotech and pharmaceutical publishing arenas. In speculation, perhaps the effect is 
further enhanced by the lack of tenure structure in the corporate setting, serving to keep 
scientists motivated to publish.” 
In our own work we observe the longevity of the TSs in an entire higher education 
system, in particular the top scientists among all Italian professors in all the science 
disciplines over the period 2001-2012. Because the longevity of a star scientist could in 
part depend on the field of research, the investigation will examine whether differences 
in longevity occur at the discipline level, within the national population. We will also 
check whether the stardom of female TSs is briefer or more prolonged than for males, 
and if longevity differs across national macro-regions. Finally, we will identify the 
national population of “unproductive” faculty, and inquire into the longevity of that 
particular status. In this regard we observe that for legislative and policy purposes, all 
96 universities in the Italian national system are research universities, and the 
responsibilities of all the individual professors include research. 
 
 
2. Data and methods 
 
The population and time-frame for the analysis consists of all Italian professors 
carrying out research in the so-called hard sciences, over the period 2001-2012. In Italy 
each professor is classified in one and only one research field. In the hard sciences, 
there are 205 such fields (named “scientific disciplinary sectors”, SDSs2), grouped into 
nine disciplines (named “university disciplinary areas”, UDAs3). The source for data on 
the faculty at each university is the database maintained by the Ministry of Education, 
Universities and Research (MIUR),4 which indexes the name, gender, academic rank, 
field (SDS/UDA), and institutional affiliation of all professors in Italian universities, 
recorded at the close of each year. 
The first step is the identification of the TSs, requiring the measurement of research 
                                                 
2 The complete list is accessible on http://attiministeriali.miur.it/UserFiles/115.htm, last accessed 
November 14, 2016. 
3 Mathematics and computer sciences, Physics, Chemistry, Earth sciences, Biology, Medicine, 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences, Civil engineering, Industrial and information engineering. 
4 http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php, last accessed November 14, 2016. 
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performance for all professors. The bibliometric indicator of performance used is the 
Fractional Scientific Strength (FSS). The FSS measures the yearly total impact of an 
individual’s research activity over a period of time, adopting the fractional counting 
method. The advantages of FSS over other per-publication citation indicators, such as 
the MNCS, are discussed in Abramo and D’Angelo (2016a; 2016b). At present we 
provide the formula to measure FSS, while referring the reader to Abramo and 
D’Angelo (2014) for a thorough treatment of the underlying microeconomic theory and 
all the limits and assumptions embedded in both the definition and the 
operationalization of the measurement. 
𝐹𝑆𝑆 =  
1
𝑡
∑
𝑐𝑖
𝑐̅
𝑁
𝑖=1
fi 
 [1] 
Where: 
t = number of years of work in the period under observation 
N = number of publications in the period under observation 
𝑐𝑖 = citations received by publication i 
𝑐̅ = average of distribution of citations received for all cited publications5 in same 
year and subject category of publication i 
fi = fractional contribution of professor to publication i. 
The fractional contribution equals the inverse of the number of authors in those 
fields where the practice is to place the authors in simple alphabetical order but assumes 
different weights in other cases. For the life sciences, widespread practice in Italy is for 
the authors to indicate the various contributions to the published research by the order 
of the names in the byline. For the life science SDSs, we give different weights to each 
co-author according to their position in the list of authors and the character of the co-
authorship (intra-mural or extra-mural) (Abramo et al., 2013b).6 
Based on the value of FSS, expressed on a percentile scale of 0-100 (worst to best), 
we obtain a ranking list of all professors for each SDS. In our analysis we investigate 
two subsets: TSs as those that place from the 90 percentile up7, and unproductive 
professors (UNs) as those with nil FSS. 
The bibliometric dataset used to measure FSS is extracted from the Observatory of 
Public Research (ORP), a database developed by the authors and derived under license 
from the Thomson-Reuters Italian National Citation Report, an extract of the WoS. 
Beginning from the raw data of the WoS and applying a complex algorithm for 
disambiguation of the true identity of the authors and reconciliation of their institutional 
affiliations, each publication is attributed to the university scientist(s) that produced it,  
with a harmonic average of precision and recall (F-measure) equal to 97% (for details 
see D’Angelo et al., 2011). For each publication, the bibliometric dataset thus provides: 
 the complete list of all coauthors; 
                                                 
5Abramo et al. (2012a) demonstrated that the average of the distribution of citations received for all cited 
publications of the same year and subject category is the most effective scaling factor. 
6 It must be noted that different fractional counting across disciplines does not cause any bias, because the 
top 10% scientists are extracted from each field. To exemplify, if we did not weight the authors’ 
contribution in Cardiology, the top 10% scientists in cardiology might change, but all the remaining top 
scientists (from the other fields) would be exactly the same. 
7 In order to check the consistency of the results, we adopt also another definition of TS, as the one whose 
performance falls above the mean of the subpopulation above the first mean of the overall population in 
their SDS, by the CSS technique (Glänzel and Schubert, 1988). 
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 the complete list of all their addresses; 
 a sub-list of only the academic authors, with their SDS/UDA and university 
affiliations. 
The observation period of production is 2001-2012, while citations are counted for 
all publications at a later date (31/05/2015). The citation window is broad enough to 
ensure robust performance scores for even the latest publications, of 2012 (Abramo et 
al., 2011). 
For examination of the longevity of top-ranked scientists, we split the timeframe 
into three four-year consecutive periods. In each period we identify the TSs and UNs 
among the researchers on staff for at least three out of the four years. (With a shorter 
period of observation the performance scores would be less robust. See Abramo et al., 
2012b). Our question is how many of the professors identified as TSs and UNs in the 
first period remain as such in the subsequent periods. Apart from the analysis of the 
overall population, the examination will also be carried out also at the gender, discipline 
and regional levels. The regional location of each TS is assigned on the basis of the 
university of their employment at the end of the first period (2004). 
 
 
3. Results 
 
We begin the analysis of TS longevity at the aggregate level and continue to the 
gender, territory and discipline levels. We then replicate the analyses for the UNs. 
From the population of Italian professors in the sciences on staff for at least three 
years in the period 2001-2004 (33168), we extract the top 10% in each SDS (3407), 
excluding those who were not on staff in the following periods (2005-2008; and 2009-
2012). For this first period (“A”, 2001-2004), the dataset thus composed consists of 
2883 TSs. We then extract the TSs from the populations in the subsequent periods, in 
similar manner. Finally we check how many 2001-2004 TSs maintain their stardom 
over the subsequent two periods. Figure 1 presents the Euler diagram for the TSs 
longevity. The inclusive circle A represents the 2883 TSs in the period 2001-2004, who 
remained on staff (whether or not as TSs) over the full time-span examined (2001-
2012). The second largest circle marked as A∩B represents the 1572 (55%) professors 
who maintained their top position in period B (2005-2009). The third circle marked as 
A∩C consists of the 1196 (41%) professors who were TSs in both periods A and C 
(2009-2012).8 The intersection of the three periods A∩B∩C represents the 1004 (35%) 
professors who hold the status of TS through all three periods. 
The analysis of gender differences in longevity shows that 16% of TSs in the first 
period are female, but only 13% maintain stardom over all three periods (Table 1). The 
concentration indices relative to the TSs across all three periods are then 0.81 for 
females and 1.04 for males. Of the 2001-2004 TSs, 36% of the men maintain their 
stardom until 2012, compared to 28% of the women. Thus it appears that the female 
scientists are less likely to maintain their stardom. 
 
                                                 
8 Concerning the intersections of two periods, we repeated the analyses but relaxing the constraint that the 
TSs must be on staff from three periods to two periods. Under this changed condition, the share of those 
who maintained their stardom for two periods resulted exactly the same as in Table 1. 
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Figure 1: Euler diagram for TS longevity: circle A represents the set of top 10% scientists in 
period A (2001-2004); B those in 2005-2008; C those in 2009-2012 
 
Table 1: Longevity of top 10% scientists by gender 
Gender A A∩B∩C A∩B∩C/A Concentration index 
M 2422 (84%) 873 (87%) 36% 1.04 
F 461 (16%) 131 (13%) 28% 0.81 
Legend: A represents the set of top scientists in period A (2001-2004); B those in 2005-2008; C those in 
2009-2012 
 
To assess variations in the longevity of TSs across disciplines we conduct the 
analysis at UDA level. Table 2 reports, for each UDA, the number of TSs in period A 
and those among them who maintained their top status in the subsequent four-year 
periods (B, C). The percentages in brackets represent the share of remaining TSs 
relative to the number in the first period. Our main concern is the intersection A∩B∩C, 
meaning the scientists who maintain their stardom over all three periods. The minimum 
share of 20% is observed in Civil engineering (UDA 8), while the maximum of 45% in 
Biology (UDA 5) followed by Medicine (42%). If a Matthew effect is at work, it seems 
it is more effective in the life sciences and less in engineering. 
 
Table 2: Longevity of top 10% scientists at UDA level 
UDA A A∩B A∩C A∩B∩C 
1 - Mathematics and computer science 280 139 (50%) 103 (37%) 77 (28%) 
2 - Physics 214 122 (57%) 75 (35%) 65 (30%) 
3 - Chemistry 247 145 (59%) 111 (45%) 99 (40%) 
4 - Earth sciences 101 44 (44%) 30 (30%) 23 (23%) 
5 - Biology 394 255 (65%) 206 (52%) 176 (45%) 
6 - Medicine 843 498 (59%) 405 (48%) 351 (42%) 
7 - Agricultural and veterinary sciences 265 121 (46%) 92 (35%) 70 (26%) 
8 - Civil engineering 127 47 (37%) 36 (28%) 26 (20%) 
9 - Industrial and information engineering 412 201 (49%) 138 (33%) 117 (28%) 
Legend: A represents the set of top scientists in period A (2001-2004); B those in 2005-2008; C those in 
2009-2012 
 
We now check the consistency of the above results, carrying out the same analysis 
for TSs defined as those whose performance is above the second mean (TSs), when 
the performance is analyzed by the CSS technique. Table 3 shows that results are 
aligned to the above ones. 
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Table 3: Longevity of TSat UDA level 
UDA A A∩B A∩C A∩B∩C 
1 - Mathematics and computer science 231 101(44%) 95(41%) 65(28%) 
2 - Physics 162 79(49%) 66(41%) 58(36%) 
3 - Chemistry 213 122(57%) 101(47%) 84(39%) 
4 - Earth sciences 83 48(58%) 31(37%) 25(30%) 
5 - Biology 265 182(69%) 152(57%) 127(48%) 
6 - Medicine 612 374(61%) 307(50%) 252(41%) 
7 - Agricultural and veterinary sciences 208 107(51%) 77(37%) 54(26%) 
8 - Civil engineering 92 50(54%) 36(39%) 24(26%) 
9 - Industrial and information engineering 312 174(56%) 123(39%) 97(31%) 
Legend: A represents the TSsin period A (2001-2004); B those in 2005-2008; C those in 2009-2012 
 
Finally we investigate the differences in longevity at the regional level. The Italian 
territory is divided into 20 administrative regions, grouped for various considerations as 
three macro-regions: north, center, and south. The south has a history of slower 
industrial and economic development than the north (Daniele and Malanima, 2011; 
SVIMEZ, 2015; ISTAT, 2015). Given that the characteristics of the higher education 
system also show a north-south divide (Viesti, 2015; Abramo et al., 2016), we are 
interested in assessing whether such a pattern extends to the longevity of TSs. 
Table 4 presents the distribution of TSs by macro-region. 52% of the 2001-2004 TSs 
are based in universities located in the north, compared to 25% in central Italy and 23% 
in the south. Out of the total TSs who maintain their stardom for three consecutive 
periods, 55% are from the north, 26% from the center, and 18% from the south. The 
concentration indexes then are respectively 1.07 in the north, 1.04 in the center, and 
0.79 in the south. Not only are there fewer TSs in the south, their longevity is also less 
compared to the other macro-regions. Looking at the 2001-2004 TSs, 37% of those 
from the north and 36% from the center maintain their stardom over three consecutive 
periods, while only 28% from the south experience this success. 
 
Table 4: Longevity of top 10% scientists by macro-region 
Macro-region A A∩B∩C A∩B∩C/A Concentration index 
North 1489 (52%) 555 (55%) 37% 1.07 
Center 733 (25%) 266 (26%) 36% 1.04 
South 661 (23%) 183 (18%) 28% 0.79 
Entire nation 2883 1004 35%  
Legend: A represents the set of top scientists in period A (2001-2004); B those in 2005-2008; C those in 
2009-2012 
 
We now replicate the analysis for the unproductive scientists, or UNs.9 The 
occurrence of UN academics should be quite exceptional, and particularly given a 
national policy requiring research, and one would hope for nil longevity of any 
instances. However, as Abramo et al. (2013a) have shown, the case of unproductive 
professors is all too common in Italy. Our question here is about the longevity of such 
faculty. 
Looking at the population of 33168 sciences professors in 2001-2004, 8217 
(24.8%) resulted as UNs, which is extraordinary high. Of these, 4703 remained as 
university faculty over all three periods (19.4% of the corresponding population of 
                                                 
9 We did not conduct the UN analysis at discipline level, since the differences in shares of UNs are 
heavily affected by WoS coverage and by publication behaviors unique to the disciplines (Abramo and 
D’Angelo, 2015). 
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professors). As shown in Figure 2, of the 4703 on staff for the entire window, 2517 
(54%) remained UNs in the second period (A∩B), and 1680 (36%) were UNs through 
the third period (A∩B∩C). We observe that the longevity of UNs is similar to TSs. 
 
 
Figure 2: Euler diagram for unproductive professors’ longevity: A represents the set of unproductive 
professors in period A (2001-2004); B those in 2005-2008; C those in 2009-2012 
 
The analysis of gender differences demonstrates that female professors make up 
26% of the UNs in the first period, and 28% of the unproductive population across all 
three periods (Table 5). The index of concentration for those remaining unproductive 
across all periods is 1.07 for females and 0.98 for males. Of the 2001-2004 UNs, 35% 
of the men and 38% of the women remain unproductive throughout. 
The distribution of UNs among the macro-regions is shown in Table 6. In the 2001-
2004 period, 37% of UNs were employed by northern universities, 26% in central Italy 
and 38% in the south. Among those who remain unproductive through all three periods, 
39% are in the north, 24% from the center, and 36% in the south. Thus, the 
concentration indexes of the longest-term UNs are respectively 1.07 in the north, 0.92 in 
the center, and 0.99 in the south. It appears then that compared to those in the south, the 
UNs in the north are marginally more capable of maintaining their dubious status. 
 
Table 5: Longevity of unproductive professors by gender 
Gender A A∩B∩C A∩B∩C/A Concentration index 
M 3486 (74%) 1216 (72%) 35% 0.98 
F 1217 (26%) 464 (28%) 38% 1.07 
Legend: A represents the set of unproductive professors in period A (2001-2004); B those in 2005-2008; 
C those in 2009-2012 
 
Table 6: Longevity of unproductive professors by macro-region 
Macro-region A A∩B∩C A∩B∩C/A Concentr. index 
North 1724 (37%) 656 (39%) 38% 1.07 
Center 1213 (26%) 397 (24%) 33% 0.92 
South 1766 (38%) 627 (36%) 36% 0.99 
Italy 4703 1680 36%   
Legend: A represents the set of unproductive professors in period A (2001-2004); B those in 2005-2008; 
C those in 2009-2012 
 
Given that the competitions for Italian academic recruitment and career 
advancement are notoriously affected by favoritism, and far from meritocratic (Perotti, 
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2008; Gerosa, 2011; Abramo et al., 2015), we wished to delve further into the career 
progress of both the TSs and UNs. In a meritocratic system one would expect that the 
“three-period” TSs employed in the lower academic ranks would have excellent 
possibilities of promotion to higher ranks, while no UNs would experience 
advancement. In fact we find that 39 (24%) of the 165 three-period TS assistant 
professors were never promoted, while 90 (11%) three-period UN assistant professors 
were advanced to associate professor. Similarly, 121 (41%) of the three-period TS 
associate professors were never promoted, while 60 (12%) of three-period UN 
associates professors did advance to full professorship. 
In Italy, the mobility of professors among universities is very low. Only 35 (3.5%) 
three-period TSs and 11 (0.65%) UNs move from one macro-region to another over the 
twelve-year period. The net balance of TSs in-outflow is positive in the north and 
negative for the other two macro-regions. The opposite is true for UNs. Although the 
numbers are very small, they suggest that, among other factors, the universities in the 
north may have a superior ability to attract TSs from other macro-regions, while getting 
rid of their UNs. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
A substantial number of studies have examined the different attributes of top 
scientists, including inquiring into the factors that could contribute to or detract from 
achieving and retaining such status. However their longevity, once arrived, has not 
received significant attention. The current study responds to this basic question. The 
findings reveal that over 12 years, 35% of top scientists retain their star status for three 
consecutive four-year periods, and 55% for two periods. The contribution of the 
Matthew effect to this staying power is difficult to estimate, however if it is at work, it 
seems more pronounced in the life sciences than in engineering. The results show that 
female TSs are less successful in maintaining their stardom than males, as could be 
expected given the role of women in Italian families, especially if with children. There 
are also regional differences in staying power: the TSs of southern Italy are more likely 
to lose their top status than those from the center, and even more so than those in the 
north. This result is aligned with the lower individual and institutional research 
productivity in the south (Abramo et al. 2016). 
It must be noted that under the remuneration policy for Italian academics, starting 
salaries and their increments are not linked to merit, thus failing to provide an important 
motivation for improving research productivity, and in particular to maintain stardom. 
In this same national system, it is not surprising that the already high share of 
unproductive scientists seems to enjoy comfortable longevity, showing proportions very 
similar to those of the TSs, to the dismay of any taxpayers. Differently from the female 
TSs, their gender counterparts among UNs slightly exceed the males in maintaining the 
laurels of nil productivity. While the analysis revealed that the TSs based in the north 
have more staying power than those in south, the same regional pattern also holds true 
for the UNs. 
A further result should be of particular interest to Italian policy makers (but not 
only). In a final analysis we examined the career progress of both the longest-lasting 
TSs and UNs (at least 12-year duration). We found that remarkable numbers of TSs 
received no promotion throughout the entire period, and that this was unhappily 
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mirrored by equally remarkable figures for UNs that were awarded advancement. 
Although scientometric analyses should be regarded as supportive to peer-review 
decision making, and exceptions can always occur, the results seem to provide in 
general additional evidence of the widespread phenomenon of favoritism and 
discrimination in Italian academic public competitions for recruitment, as shown by a 
number of previous studies and the recent warning by the President of the Italian anti 
corruption authority.10 
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